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### HOW TO ASSESS HEDGE FUNDS PERFORMANCES IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS?

The beginning of June is a good time to turn around and review the behavior of alternative strategies over the past 5 months. Indeed, the brutal market collapse of Equities and Bond valuations is now three months behind us. We are still in the very heart of the Coronavirus outbreak and most of the economic consequences of the epidemic are ahead of us and yet to be fully appraised. Nevertheless, the ripples of the initial market shock have had enough time to reach all asset classes, causing dislocations and inflicting pain here and there, and over the past few weeks, markets have engaged in a partial rebound.

Looking more closely at the chain of events:

- Markets collapsed -34% from peak to trough (MSCI World Index)\*, as the Coronavirus outbreak spread to Europe and the U.S. and as the massive lockdown of populations across the world took a devastating toll on economic activity.
- Financial markets experienced wide gyrations. Equity volatility in the U.S. reached all-time highs. Systemic risks resurfaced, liquidity vanished in some market segments, and the unexpected happened (including negative oil prices, announced dividends cancellations)
- This led major central banks to take unprecedented measures. Aggressive fiscal stimulus was also implemented, leading risk assets to bottom on March 23<sup>rd</sup> and to rebound since then.

In this context, investors had three expectations for alternative strategies:

1. To exhibit a low sensitivity to risky assets and to resist well to the market shock
2. To avoid the possible pitfalls of active management in times of crises: the added losses coming from crowded positions, lack of internal diversification, leverage and liquidity issues
3. To maintain or tactically increase their exposures to participate in the market recovery.

A large portion of Hedge Fund managers navigated successfully is this challenging path:

- They embarked in the crisis with a prudent stance, both in terms of net and gross exposures. The average beta among Lyxor funds was below 20% at the beginning of February.
- We saw little force selling, the impact of the dislocations was temporary and when they occurred some managers were opportunistic and increased positions.
- Liquidity was met without significant market impact or portfolio distortion.
- Finally, the participation to the market upside is very satisfying: the HFRX Index has retraced 50% of its drawdown, which is similar to the recovery of the equity market which retraced 55%.

**” A large portion of Hedge Fund managers met expectations. ”**

\*From 19/02/2020 to 23/03/2020

# MOOREA FUND – GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITIES

## WHAT WAS THE POSITIONING OF MOOREA GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITIES (“GAO”) AHEAD OF THIS CRISIS?

We decided late last year to reconsider the multi-strategy stance of the fund and decision was taken to concentrate the allocation on equity-linked strategies, that naturally respect UCITS constraints without significant portfolio distortion, and that have proved their capacity to maintain their performance objectives within this format.


Indeed, a series of analysis and back-tests confirmed what we anticipated: some strategies generally failed to produce the same type of returns within a UCITS format, compared to the offshore world. This was notably the case for Global Macro and Fixed-Income/Credit strategies.

” *The reshuffling of Moorea GAO asset allocation towards equity-linked alternative strategies ahead of the crisis proved successful.* ”

Consequently, allocation to equity-linked strategies (Event-Driven, Long/Short Equity and Equity Market Neutral) was increased from 60% early January 2020 to nearly 80% at the end of May. While doing so, we made sure not to add directional equity exposure, and we kept a defensive portfolio aiming at generating absolute returns.

Results proved successful during the market correction and Moorea GAO managed to mitigate losses over Q1 with a loss of -3.8% (Shareclass Retail €) to be compared with a loss of -8.2% for the HFRX Global Hedge Fund EUR Index and -21.4% for the MSCI World Index.

### Strategic allocation breakdown as at 31/05/2020



Source: SGPWM, 31/05/2020

## WHAT WERE THE MAIN DRIVERS OF PERFORMANCE?

Long Short Equity managers entered the period with low to moderate exposures. They maintained a stable risk budget which enabled them to fully benefit from the recovery. Stock picking was also generally rewarded, and several funds posted positive returns during the period.

Long Short Equity Market Neutral strategies were not fully immune to the sell off, but the typical factor rotations (including growth to quality) that occurred - traditionally caused by deleveraging in such crises - was well managed and its impact small.

Merger Arbitrage suffered an unusual volatility in returns due to a sharp widening in deal spreads when systemic risk rose in the first half of March. Pressure on spreads has likely intensified due to increases in margin requirements and forced unwinding of highly levered managers and among quantitatively-driven funds. The strategy has been one of the very few ones to act opportunistically and deploy capital when spreads were wide. It recouped most of the losses in the second half of March and in April.

CTAs outperformed and behaved very well during the market selloff. Long equity positions were swiftly cut while long fixed income, long USD were increased.

On the negative side, Global Macro suffered from the fall in bond yields and the steepening of yield curves. Their exposure to EM assets (fixed income and currencies) was also a headwind.

” *Merger Arbitrage has been one of the very few ones to act opportunistically and deploy capital when spreads were wide.* ”

# MOOREA FUND – GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITIES

## Top contributors:

- **Lyxor / Sandler US Equity Fund** (+7.8% YTD as of 31/05/2020). The fund benefited from its disciplined portfolio management process (maintaining a low gross exposure and a small net short positioning), as well as from the team strong short stock-picking skills across various industries: financials, consumer discretionary, leisure and lodging. The fund kept so far a defensive stance, albeit with a small net equity short position of -6%.
- **Lyxor / Epsilon Global Trend Fund** (+7.0% YTD as of 31/05/2020). The strategy (medium to long term trend) was able to rapidly cut its risk profile by more than half. Over the period, allocations sat with long positions in rates and bond clusters, short equities and currency clusters.

## Top detractors:

- **Lyxor / Bridgewater Core Global Macro Fund** (-13.2% YTD as of 31/05/2020). Losses were predominantly driven by the Alpha component which was positioned long risk assets (long equities, short bonds) going into and during early March. This led to

numerous shifts in the portfolio including a move to long stance on the fixed income complex where the fund models still see some room for rates to come down across the curve and regions. On equity, the positioning is much more relative value than directional long.

**Lumyna - PSAM Global Event UCITS Fund** (-3% YTD as of 31/05/2020). At one point merger spreads widened to levels last seen in 2008. Whilst spreads have narrowed, they are still significantly wider than at the end of February.

## CONCLUSION

Going forward, our strategy is to keep the allocation unchanged overall for the moment as we are not comfortable with the sharp move upward of equity markets and we expect the Q2 earning season (happening this summer) could be potentially quite volatile. We prefer not to chase the recent rally and stay defensive at this stage.

We remain ready to increase risks as soon as we have more visibility. We have identified a few dynamic / more aggressive Long/Short Equity managers that would be good additions to the portfolio, but the time to buy Cyclical and Value aggressively has not yet come.

## HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE OF MOOREA GAO VS HFRX GLOBAL HEDGE FUND INDEX € (SINCE INCEPTION)

Retail EUR Share class



	YTD	2019	2018	2017	2016*	Since inception* cumulative
<b>Moorea GAO Retail Euro share class</b>	-1,07%	2,36%	-5,47%	2,29%	-1,06%	-3,12%
<b>HFRX Global HF Index</b>	-4,75%	3,44%	-9,93%	3,49%	2,94%	-5,46%

\*Launch date 10/05/2016

Source: SGPWM, Bloomberg – 29/05/2020

# MOOREA FUND – GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITIES

## KEY INFORMATION

<b>UCITS Risk/return grading</b>	1 2 <b>3</b> 4 5 6 7
<b>Legal structure</b>	UCITS Luxembourg Sicav
<b>Management company</b>	Societe Generale Private Wealth Management S.A.
<b>Investment Manager</b>	Lyxor Asset Management
<b>Investment Advisor</b>	Societe Generale Private Banking Switzerland
<b>Custodian / ValuationAgent</b>	Société Générale Luxembourg
<b>Reference currency</b>	EUR
<b>Initial Net Asset Value</b>	EUR 1 000
<b>Date of launch</b>	May 2016
<b>Valuation - Subscriptions / redemptions</b>	Weekly

## AVAILABLE SHARE CLASSES

		<b>ISIN Code</b>	<b>Ongoing charges*</b>	<b>of which management fees</b>
RE	Retail EUR Acc	LU1391857817	3,29%	1,60%
RE-D	Retail EUR Dis	LU1449961785	3,29%	1,60%
RUHE	Retail USD Acc	LU1391857908	3,29%	1,60%

\*Ongoing charges are based on the expenses for the last financial year. They may vary from year to year.

# **MOOREA FUND – GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITIES**

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## **POTENTIAL RISKS IN CASE OF AN INVESTMENT**

Counterparty risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, operational risk, market risk, concentration risk.

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